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Linguistic Hooks:
Overcoming Adverse Cognitive
Stock Structures in Statutory Interpretation
Michael R. Smith*
Much has been written in recent years about the role of mental stock
structures—or cognitive prototypes—in statutory interpretation.1 As these
works point out, many issues of statutory interpretation arise due to a
cognitive collision between the facts of the case at hand and the mental
stock structure implicated by a word or phrase in the applicable statute.2
Consider, for example, a statute that regulates “chairs.”3 For most people,
the stock structure for “chair” would be a mental image of an object with
four legs and a backrest, designed for one person to sit on.4 Would this
statute apply to benches? How about stools? Or couches? Each of these
words conjures up its own stock structure that is close to, yet inconsistent
with, the stock structure for “chair.”5 As this simple example illustrates,
then, many issues of statutory interpretation arise based on a collision of
seemingly incompatible cognitive images.
* Winston S. Howard Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of Legal Writing, University of Wyoming College of
Law. I would like to thank Ruth Anne Robbins of Rutgers-Camden Law School for her tremendous support on this project.
I would also like to thank the faculty of Stetson Law School, who provide helpful comments during a presentation of this
topic at a faculty colloquium. I would also like to express my appreciation to Lois Ann Smith, who provided helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. Finally, I would like to thank Peg Howard, Joan Maclachlan, and the Winston S.
Howard Distinguished Professorship endowment for providing funds in support of this article.
1 E.g. J. Gordon Christy, A Prolegomena to Federal Statutory Interpretation: Identifying the Sources of Interpretative
Problems, 76 Miss. L.J. 55, 112–13 (2006); Jonnette Watson Hamilton, Theories of Categorization: A Case Study of Cheques,
17 Can. J.L. & Soc’y 115, 123–36 (No. 1, 2002); Sanford Schane, Ambiguity and Misunderstanding in the Law, 25 Thomas
Jefferson L. Rev. 167, 177–78, 186–89 (2002); Lawrence M. Solan, Judicial Decisions and Linguistic Analysis: Is There a
Linguist in the Court?, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1069, 1072–80 (1995) [hereinafter Solan, Linguist in the Court]; Lawrence M. Solan,
Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 57, 65–77 (1998) [hereinafter Solan, Language and Lenity]; Lawrence
M. Solan, Why Laws Work Pretty Well, But Not Great: Words and Rules in Legal Interpretation, 26 L. & Soc. Inquiry 243,
256–59 (2001) [hereinafter Solan, Words and Rules]; Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and
Statutory Interpretation, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 431, 455, 463 (2001); Abby Wright, For All Intents and Purposes: What Collective
Intention Tells Us About Congress and Statutory Interpretation, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 983, 993–96 (2006).
2 See supra n. 1. This is only one source of statutory ambiguity. For a general discussion of other sources, see generally
Christy, supra note 1.
3 This illustration is adapted from Tiersma, supra n. 1, at 455, who, in turn, adapted it from Solan, Linguist in the Court,
supra n. 1, at 1073.
4 See Tiersma, supra n. 1, at 455.
5 See id.
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Statutory issues such as these are a consequence of cognitive
linguistics. Based on its typical linguistic usage in American English, the
word at issue in the statute (like “chair”) conjures up a speciﬁc cognitive
stock structure that is incompatible with the item or concept represented
by the current case (like a couch).6 These types of statutory issues present
unique problems for legal advocates. Generally, legal advocates attempting
to resolve issues of statutory ambiguity turn directly to standard tools of
statutory interpretation such as legislative history, canons of statutory
construction, persuasive judicial precedent, and policy.7 A court, however,
is unlikely to be persuaded by a nonbinding interpretive tool when it is
faced with a linguistic and cognitive mismatch between the relevant
statutory term and the present facts.8 Thus, unlike with other types of
statutory issues, with these, the legal advocate faces a threshold linguistic
hurdle. That is, an advocate in this situation, as an initial matter, must
offer a linguistic explanation—a linguistic hook, if you will—that plausibly
reconciles the instinctive cognitive collision presented by the statutory
issue at hand. Only after the statutory issue is at least plausibly resolved
from a linguistic (and cognitive) standpoint can the advocate turn to the
other, more conventional, tools of statutory argument.9
Of the numerous articles that identify the phenomenon of cognitive
stock structures as a source of statutory ambiguity,10 none explores what
this phenomenon means for the legal advocate. That is where this article
comes in. This article builds on the prior literature by exploring some relatively untapped and underappreciated advocacy techniques for
overcoming adverse stock structures implicated by statutory language.
Speciﬁcally, this article explores strategies that enable a legal advocate to
evoke—consciously, and with design—an alternative and more favorable
stock structure that is compatible with both the statutory language and the
client’s facts.11 These strategies provide advocates with the very linguistic
hook needed to open the issue up for other, more conventional, forms of

6 See e.g. George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind 86–87 (U. Chi. Press
1987) (discussing the fact that “an enormous amount” of Idealized Cognitive Models (i.e., mental stock structures) for
commonly used words are formed by repeated exposure to “typical examples” of items representing those words); Vyvyan
Evans & Melanie Green, Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction 272–74 (Edinburgh U. Press 2006) (discussing “typicality
effects due to metonymy”); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agony Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2225, 2233–35 (1989).
7 See generally e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Statutory Interpretation
(2d ed., Found. Press 2006); Linda D. Jellum & David Charles Hricik, Modern Statutory Interpretation: Problems, Theories,
and Lawyering Strategies (2d ed., Carolina Acad. Press 2009).
8 In fact the law in most jurisdictions forbids advocates arguing extrinsic aids of statutory construction if the language of
the provision in question appears to be unambiguous. See infra text accompanying n. 85, 113.
9 See infra text accompanying n. 85, 118–21.
10 See supra n. 1.
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statutory analysis. The ultimate goal of this article is to provide legal
advocates with potentially powerful new advocacy strategies in issues of
statutory interpretation.
Part I of this article explains the theory underlying cognitive stock
structures and identiﬁes two distinct forms of statutory ambiguity that
stem from stock structures implicated by statutory language. Only one of
these forms of ambiguity presents advocates with the type of linguistic
hurdle discussed here. Part II then explores speciﬁc strategies by which a
legal advocate can attempt to overcome this linguistic hurdle. Part III
wraps up the discussion by explaining the relevance and usefulness of
these techniques in the general context of statutory advocacy.

I. Cognitive Stock Structures and
Two Types of Statutory Ambiguity
According to cognitive psychology theory, one of the basic components of
human cognition is the phenomenon of “stock structures”12 (also called
“idealized cognitive models,”13 or mental “prototypes”14). “Stock structures
are generic, idealized models that are formed in the mind and that
represent common social situations, social phenomena, people, places,
and objects.”15 These idealized models help people make sense of and
respond to the world in an efﬁcient manner by allowing us to encounter or
to communicate about common objects or social situations without
having to reevaluate them entirely anew.16 Professor Steven Winter offers
this example of a stock structure:
Suppose, for example, we enter a restaurant, seat ourselves, and are
then confronted by a human with pad and pencil. Does this stranger
want to hear our life stories? Challenge our right to enter the premises?
Take our bet on the afternoon race? Any of these are possible and, on

11 As this article will demonstrate, this strategy of offering an alternative stock structure for a statutory word or phrase has
been used with success by some legal advocates. However, these uses have mostly been by intuition or accident on the part
of the advocates, without full appreciation of their bases in human cognition. One of the main goals of this article is to help
legal advocates more fully appreciate the cognitive dimensions of this strategy so that it can be used more consciously and,
therefore, more effectively.
12 E.g. Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 5–6 (1984); Michael R. Smith, Advanced Legal Writing:
Theories and Strategies in Persuasive Writing 42–43 (2d ed., Aspen Pub. 2008).
13 E.g. Winter, supra n. 6, at 2233–36; Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105, 1153–54 (1989); Lakoff, supra n. 6, at 68–90. Lakoff distinguishes between
prototypes and ICMs. Id. at 40–46, 68–90. This distinction, however, is not important for our purposes, and this article
uses these terms interchangeably.
14 See supra n. 1.
15 Smith, supra n. 12, at 42.
16 E.g. id.; Lopez, supra n. 12, at 3, 5–6.
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particular occasions, may in fact be the case. Yet, we “know” automatically that the person is asking for our order because we have
unreflexively assumed a “restaurant scenario” which organizes our
understanding of the events around us.17

Professor Gerald Lopez explains the role stock structures play in the
way people process and interact with the world on a daily basis:18
To understand . . . the world, [humans] depend heavily on “stock stories,”
“stock characters” and “stock theories”—knowledge of events, people,
objects, and their characteristic relationships organized and represented
by a variety of “stock structures.” Some stock structures result from
direct personal experiences; others are entirely vicarious. . . . Together
these stock structures form an interpretive network: What goes on in [a
given situation] is never approached sui generis, but rather is seen
through these stock structures. Once the principal features of a given
phenomenon suggest a particular stock structure, that structure shapes
our expectations and responses. This use of stock structures resolves
ambiguity and complements “given” information with much “assumed”
information. 19

Stock structures thus “help us carry out the routine activities of life
without constantly having to analyze or question what we are doing.”20
Prof. Winter’s example and Prof. Lopez’s discussion focus primarily
on stock structures for social situations. But stock structures also exist for
words. Based on both physical experience and linguistic usage, people
form cognitive stock structures for commonly used words and phrases. In
this context, then, a stock structure is an idealized mental picture that a
person instinctively thinks of when he or she hears or reads a particular
word or phrase.21
The articles about the role of stock structures in statutory interpretation explain that many legal disputes involving issues of statutory
interpretation arise because the facts of the case at hand are not readily
compatible with the stock structure evoked by the relevant word or phrase
in the applicable statute.22 A simple example of this phenomenon is the
introduction’s question whether a couch or stool would ﬁt under a statute
regulating “chairs.”
Numerous other examples of these cognitive collisions in statutory
interpretation are discussed in other articles, though these unwittingly

17 Winter, supra n. 6, at 2233; accord Smith, supra n. 12, at
42–43.

20 Id. at 3; see also Smith, supra n. 12, at 43.

18 Lopez, supra n. 12, at 5–6.

21 See e.g. Lakoff, supra n. 6, at 86–87; Evans & Green,
supra n. 6, at 272–74; Winter, supra n. 6, at 2233–35.

19 Id. at 5–63. accord see also Smith, supra n. 12, at 43.

22 See supra n. 1.
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signiﬁcantly limit the inquiry in that they present these examples as manifestations of one general type of statutory ambiguity. But a close review of
these types of statutory issues reveals that there are actually two separate
and distinct forms of statutory ambiguity resulting from the stock
structures implicated by statutory terms. Only one of these types of
ambiguity is relevant to the discussion here, though, so distinguishing the
two is important. In the absence of better terminology, I will refer to these
two types of statutory ambiguity as technically in ambiguity and technically out ambiguity.
A. Technically In Statutory Ambiguity
Of the two forms of statutory ambiguity discussed here, technically in
ambiguity has, by far, received the most attention in the existing literature
(using different terminology, of course). Technically in ambiguity arises
when the item or concept presented by the current fact scenario falls
within the technical deﬁnition of a statutory term but does not ﬁt within
the stock structure evoked by that term. This type of statutory ambiguity
stems from the cognitive complexities of categorization.23
Under the classical view of categories, “all members of a category have
a set of common properties,”24 and determining whether an object or
entity ﬁts into a category simply means ascertaining whether the item
meets the deﬁning properties.25 Since the 1970s, however, studies in
cognitive psychology have revealed that categorization is actually much
more complex.26 In fact, the most recent research suggests that people
think about categories in two different, yet not entirely consistent, ways.27
On the one hand, these studies reveal, consistent with the classical
approach, that people do determine an object’s inclusion into a category,
at least in part, by considering the deﬁning properties of the category.28
On the other hand, however, people also think of categories in terms of
prototypical members. That is, people also have a tendency to equate—or
at least associate—a category with the standard stock structures for that
category.29 And these two approaches to categorization often lead to
inconsistent results.30

23 See e.g. Schane, supra n. 1, at 177–78; Solan, Words and
Rules, supra n. 1, at 257–58; Solan, Language and Lenity,
supra n. 1, at 65–69.
24 Schane, supra n. 1, at 177.
25 E.g. id.; Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 257.
26 See e.g. Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 257–58.
27 Id.; see also generally Sharon Lee Armstrong, Lila R.
Gleitman & Henry Gleitman, What Some Concepts Might

Not Be, 13 Cognition 263 (1983) (presenting a “duel theory”
of categorization).
28 E.g. Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 257–58;
Armstrong et al., supra n. 26, at 266–68, 285–95.
29 E.g. Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 257–58;
Armstrong et al., supra n. 26, at 269–95.
30 See Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 258–59;
Armstrong et al., supra n. 26, at 291–95.
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Consider, for example, the category of objects represented by the
word “bird.”31 Studies show that the two cognitive approaches to categorization lead to some uncertainty about the boundaries of this seemingly
simple category.32 Consistent with the stock structure–prototype
approach to categorization, subjects tend to view a robin as a good
example of a bird and an ostrich as a bad example of a bird.33 These
subjects tend to determine inclusion into the category based in part on the
standard stock structure for “bird,” which, for most people, would be birds
of common experience such as robins, sparrows, and wrens.34 Ostriches,
on the other hand, are, for most people, not prototypical “birds,” and thus
are not instinctively included in the category.35 This, however, is not the
only approach to categorization. Consistent with the classical approach,
subjects, when pushed, readily state that even nonprototypical species of
birds—like ostriches—are, nevertheless, “birds.”36 Thus, as these studies
illustrate, people generally have dual cognitive approaches to categorization.37
Technically in issues of statutory ambiguity reside in the gap created
by these two cognitive approaches to categorization—that is, in the gap
between the technical deﬁnition of a term (i.e., category) and the standard
stock structure(s) evoked by the term. To extend the previous example, if a
statute was enacted regulating “birds,” the two cognitive approaches to
categorization would likely lead to ambiguity as to whether the statute was
intended to regulate all technical species of birds or whether it was
intended to regulate only prototypical birds. Issues such as these arise
because it is unclear—and debatable—whether the legislative body
enacting the statute in question intended the broad deﬁnitional meaning
of the statutory term or whether it intended the term’s prototypical
meaning.38 I call this type of statutory ambiguity technically in ambiguity
because in such cases, the item or concept at issue does “technically” ﬁt

31 The “bird” example of cognitive prototypes is a popular one, as evidenced by its use in many articles. See Christy, supra
n. 1, at 113; Hamilton, supra n. 1, at 123–24 (attributing the “bird” example to B. Tversky & K. Hemenway, Objects, Parts,
and Categories, 113 J. Experimental Psychol. 169 (1984)); Schane, supra n. 1, at 178; Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at
257–58 (discussing Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 104 J. of Experimental Psychol. 192
(1975)).
32 Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 257.
33 Id.; Hamilton, supra n. 1, at 123–24; Christy, supra n. 1, at 113.
34 See Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 257; Hamilton, supra n. 1, at 123–24; Schane, supra n. 1, at 177–78.
35 Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 257; Hamilton, supra n. 1, at 123–24; Christy, supra n. 1, at 113.
36 Armstrong et al., supra n. 26, at 285, 285–91; see also Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 258.
37 Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 257–58; Armstrong et al., supra n. 26, at 291–95.
38 The terms “deﬁnitional” meaning and “prototypical” meaning are borrowed from Solan, Linguist in the Court, supra n. 1,
at 1073–76.
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within the deﬁnitional meaning of the statutory term; however, it does not
ﬁt within the prototypical meaning of the term. Formal examples of technically in statutory ambiguity abound in case law. I consider three rather
famous United States Supreme Court examples here:
1. Smith v. United States 39

John Angus Smith made an offer to an undercover police ofﬁcer to trade
his automatic weapon (a MAC-10) for a speciﬁed amount of cocaine.40 Mr.
Smith was arrested and subsequently convicted under federal law of,
among other crimes, using a ﬁrearm “during and in relation to . . . [a] drug
trafﬁcking crime.”41 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the
primary issue in the case was “whether the exchange of a gun for narcotics
constitute[d] ‘use’ of a ﬁrearm . . . within the meaning of [the federal
statute].”42
The majority of the Court answered the question in the afﬁrmative.43
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor stated the following:
When a word is not deﬁned by statute, we normally construe it in
accord with its ordinary or natural meaning. . . . Surely petitioner’s
treatment of his MAC-10 can be described as “use” within the everyday
meaning of that term. Petitioner “used” his MAC-10 in an attempt to
obtain drugs by offering to trade it for cocaine. Webster’s deﬁnes “to use”
as “[t]o convert to one’s service” or “to employ.” Webster’s New
International Dictionary 2806 (2d ed. 1939). Black’s Law Dictionary
contains a similar deﬁnition: “[t]o make use of; to convert to one’s
service; to employ; to avail oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a purpose or
action by means of.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990). . . .
Petitioner’s handling of the MAC-10 in this case falls squarely within
those deﬁnitions. By attempting to trade his MAC-10 for the drugs, he
“used” or “employed” it as an item of barter to obtain cocaine; he “derived
service” from it because it was going to bring him the very drugs he
sought.44

39 508 U.S. 223 (1993). The Smith case has been discussed in a number of prior articles as an example of statutory
ambiguity created by cognitive prototypes. See Solan, Linguist in the Court, supra n. 1, at 1074–76; Solan, Language and
Lenity, supra n. 1, at 68; Solan, Words and Rules, supra n. 1, at 258; Christy, supra n. 1, at 113 n.143.
40 Smith, 508 U.S. at 225–26.
41 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A) (2006) (cited in Smith, 508 U.S. at 226).
42 Smith, 508 U.S. at 225.
43 Id. at 237.
44 Id. at 228–29.
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Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Souter,
reached the opposite conclusion:
In the search for statutory meaning, we give nontechnical words
and phrases their ordinary meaning. . . . To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose. When someone asks, “Do
you use a cane?,” he is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather’s
silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know
whether you walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of “using a ﬁrearm” is
to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon. To be
sure, “one can use a ﬁrearm in a number of ways” [majority opinion, at
230], including as an article of exchange, just as one can “use” a cane as a
hall decoration—but that is not the ordinary meaning of “using” the one
or the other. The Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between
how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used. It would, indeed,
be “both reasonable and normal to say that petitioner ‘used’ his MAC-10
in his drug trafﬁcking offense by trading it for cocaine.” Ibid. It would
also be reasonable and normal to say that he “used” it to scratch his head.
When one wishes to describe the action of employing the instrument of
a ﬁrearm for such unusual purposes, “use” is assuredly a verb one could
select. But that says nothing about whether the ordinary meaning of the
phrase “uses a ﬁrearm” embraces such extraordinary employments. It is
unquestionably not reasonable and normal, I think, to say simply “do not
use ﬁrearms” when one means to prohibit selling or scratching with
them.45

The Smith case provides a striking example of technically in statutory
ambiguity. To answer the question whether the statutory term “using a
ﬁrearm” includes using a gun for barter, the majority looked to the broad
dictionary deﬁnition of the word “use” and held, consistent with that
deﬁnition, that it did. The dissent, on the other hand, looked to the stock
structure evoked by the term, arguing that the “ordinary” (i.e., prototypical) meaning of the phrase “using a ﬁrearm” is using a ﬁrearm for its
intended purpose, as a weapon. The issue presented by Smith is an
example of technically in statutory ambiguity because although using a
gun for barter “technically” falls within the deﬁnitional meaning of “using”
an instrumentality, it does not fall within the stock structure for “using a
ﬁrearm,” which for most people is a mental picture of someone using a gun
in a violent or threatening manner. Thus, the issue in this case stemmed
from a conflict created by the two cognitive approaches to categorization.
The majority in Smith addressed the issue under the classical deﬁnitional

45 Id. at 242–43 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting).

LINGUISTIC HOOKS

approach to categorization, looking to the broad deﬁnition of the word
“use” and evaluating the petitioner’s behavior against the term’s deﬁning
properties. The dissent, by contrast, employed the stock structure–
prototype approach, equating the category to the standard stock structure
evoked by the statutory term.46 As the Court’s 6–3 split decision shows,
both approaches were not merely plausible; they were legitimately
arguable. Ultimately, however, a majority of the Court chose the broad
interpretation using a combination of the term’s deﬁnitional meaning,
various canons of statutory construction, and the provision’s legislative
history.47
As if she was aware of the cognitive principles underlying the dispute,
Justice O’Connor included in her opinion an express rebuttal of the
dissent’s prototype approach to the issue:
[P]etitioner and the dissent . . . contend that the average person on the
street would not think immediately of a guns-for-drugs trade as an
example of “us[ing] a firearm.” Rather, that phrase normally evokes an
image of the most familiar use to which a firearm is put—use as a
weapon. Petitioner and the dissent therefore argue that the statute
excludes uses where the weapon is not ﬁred or otherwise employed for
its destructive capacity. . . .
There is a signiﬁcant flaw to this argument. It is one thing to say that
the ordinary meaning of “uses a ﬁrearm” includes using a ﬁrearm as a
weapon, since that is the intended purpose of a ﬁrearm and the example
of “use” that most immediately comes to mind. But it is quite another to
conclude that, as a result, the phrase also excludes any other use. . . . As
the dictionary deﬁnitions and experience make clear, one can use a
ﬁrearm in a number of ways. That one example of “use” is the first to
come to mind when the phrase “uses . . . a firearm” is uttered does not
preclude us from recognizing that there are other “uses” that qualify as
well.48

As indicated by the highlighted language in this quote—“average
person on the street,” “think immediately of,” “phrase normally evokes an
image,” “most immediately comes to mind,” and “ﬁrst to come to mind,”
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that the phrase “using a ﬁrearm” may
have a prototypical meaning that is inconsistent with the petitioner’s
charge. She and the majority concluded, however, that the term should not
be limited to its prototypical meaning.

46 Lawrence M. Solan presented a similar analysis of Smith in Solan, Words and Rules, supra note 1, at 258.
47 Smith, 508 U.S. at 228–37.
48 Id. at 229–30 (italicized emphasis added; bold emphasis in original).
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As a ﬁnal comment on the Smith case, it is interesting to note that
both the majority and the dissent claimed that their conclusions were
supported by the “ordinary meaning” of the statutory term.49 Upon closer
analysis, however, this is not surprising because the two opinions viewed
“ordinary meaning” in different ways. The majority viewed “ordinary
meaning” as a meaning supported by the ordinary dictionary deﬁnition of
the term in question.50 The dissent, by contrast, viewed “ordinary
meaning” as the meaning ordinarily and instinctively evoked in one’s mind
by the term.51 Although the two approaches lead to conflicting results,
they were both “ordinary” because they corresponded to the two innate
cognitive approaches to categorization. And therein lies the source of technically in statutory ambiguity: Because humans approach categorization
in two, often inconsistent, ways, disputes over whether a statutory term
was intended to have its deﬁnitional meaning or its prototypical meaning
are virtually inevitable.52
2. McBoyle v. United States53

In McBoyle, the petitioner flew from Illinois to Oklahoma in an airplane
he knew to be stolen.54 He was subsequently convicted under the National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act, which prohibited transporting a stolen “vehicle”
across state lines.55 Not surprisingly, the issue on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court was whether an airplane qualiﬁed as a “vehicle” for
the purposes of the Act.56
The issue in McBoyle clearly can be classiﬁed as an issue of technically
in statutory ambiguity. In fact, Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion for
the unanimous Court, speciﬁcally acknowledged the conflict that existed
between the deﬁnitional and prototypical meanings of the term “vehicle”:
The question is the meaning of the word “vehicle” . . . . No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify a conveyance working on
land, water or air . . . . But in everyday speech “vehicle” calls up the
picture of a thing moving on land.57

49 See supra text accompanying nn. 43, 44.
50 Smith, 508 U.S. at 228–29 (relying on the deﬁnitions of
“to use” in Webster’s Dictionary and Black’s Law
Dictionary).
51 Id. at 242–43 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.,
dissenting).
52 But see Tiersma, supra n. 1, at 455–57, 464–71
(discussing as possible solutions to this problem (1) moreeffectively drafted statutory deﬁnitions, (2) the use of “word
lists” is statutes, and (3) the inclusion of statutory
preambles that clearly state the statutes’ goals); Schane,
supra n. 1, at 191–92 (discussing Tiersma’s proposals).

53 283 U.S. 25 (1931). Other articles that use the issue in
McBoyle as an example of the interplay between cognition
and statutory ambiguity include Solan, Words and Rules,
supra note 1, at 244–45, and Lief H. Carter, Law and
Politics as Play, 83 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1333, 1344 (2008).
54 McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 25.
55 Id. at 25–26.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 26.
58 Id. at 27.
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In the end, the Court held that the National Motor Vehicle Act did not
apply to airplanes.58 The Court reached this conclusion based on the
prototypical meaning of the term “vehicle,” as well as a combination of
legislative history and policy arguments.59
3. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 60

The Holy Trinity case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1892, illustrates that issues of technically in statutory ambiguity are by no means a
new phenomenon. In that case, a New York church hired a pastor from
England to be the church’s new religious leader.61 The federal government
then brought an action against the church to recover a penalty under a
federal statute that prohibited any person or entity in the United States
from importing a foreigner to perform labor in this country.62 The issue
before the Supreme Court was whether to work of a pastor qualiﬁed as
“labor” under the statute.63 Justice Brewer, writing for the unanimous
Court, began his opinion by acknowledging that the work of a pastor
would technically fall under the deﬁnitional meaning of the word “labor”:
“It must be conceded that the act of the [church] is within the letter of this
section, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service, and
implies labor on the one side with compensation on the other.”64 The
Court also pointed out, however, that the word “labor,” in both the title
and the body of the statute, instinctively evokes the mental image of
manual labor as opposed to the work of a professional:
Obviously the thought expressed in this reaches only to the work of the
manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional man. No
one reading such a title would suppose that congress had in its mind any
purpose of staying the coming into this country of ministers of the
gospel, or, indeed, of any class whose toil is that of the brain. The
common understanding of the terms “labor” and “laborers” does not
include preaching and preachers, and it is to be assumed that words and
phrases are used in their ordinary meaning.65

Ultimately the Court held that the statute did not apply to the hiring
of a foreign pastor and reversed the penalty imposed under the statute.66

59 Id. at 26–27.
60 143 U.S. 457 (1892). This example is adapted from
Solan, Words and Rules, supra note 1, at 244. The Holy
Trinity case is also used as a running example of statutory
interpretation in Eskridge et al., supra note 7, at 221–55.
61 Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 457–58.
62 Id. at 458.

63 See id. at 458–59. The statute at issue in Holy Trinity
referred to both “labor” and “service,” id. at 458, but the
Court focused primarily on the meaning of the word
“labor,” id. at 463–65. And it is this analysis that is most
relevant to this discussion. Accord Solan, Words and Rules,
supra n. 1, at 244.
64 Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 458.
65 Id. at 463.
66 Id. at 472.
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The Court reached this conclusion based on a combination of the prototypical meaning of the term “labor” and various other arguments based on
canons of construction, legislative history, and policy.67
Like the previous two cases, the Holy Trinity case had at its heart an
issue of technically in statutory ambiguity. The deﬁnition of the word
“labor,” as acknowledged by the Court, was broad enough to encompass
the work of professionals, including pastors. Thus, the facts of the case
technically came within the deﬁnitional meaning of the statutory term.
However, the term “labor,” as also acknowledged by the Court, had a
contrasting stock structure: that of manual labor. Thus, the real issue in
the cases was whether Congress intended to use the word “labor” for its
broad deﬁnitional meaning or whether it intended the word’s prototypical
meaning. In the end, the Court held in favor of the latter interpretation.
Two general observations about technically in statutory ambiguity can
be made based on a review of the Smith, McBoyle, and Holy Trinity cases.
First, both of the cognitive approaches to categorization that we have
discussed can have persuasive force in issues of technically in statutory
ambiguity. In the Smith case, the deﬁnitional meaning of the term “use”
prevailed over the prototypical approach.68 By contrast, in both the
McBoyle and Holy Trinity cases, the prototypical meaning of the applicable
statutory terms prevailed.69 Thus, both approaches to deﬁning statutory
terms are rhetorically and legally valid, and it is possible for either to
prevail in any given case.
The ﬁrst general observation leads to the second: both approaches are
linguistically plausible. Because the deﬁnitional approach to categorization
is natural and innate, a legitimate linguistic argument can be made that the
enacting body intended a statutory term to have its deﬁnitional meaning.
Likewise, because the prototypical approach to categorization is natural
and innate, a legitimate linguistic argument can be made that the enacting
body intended a statutory term to have its prototypical meaning. Both of
these arguments have persuasive force because both are plausible from a
linguistic standpoint. As a consequence, technically in issues of statutory
ambiguity do not pose signiﬁcant linguistic problems for legal advocates.
An advocate arguing in favor of the deﬁnitional meaning of a statutory
term need only turn to the dictionary for linguistic support.70 By the same
token, an advocate arguing the prototypical meaning of a term need only

67 Id. at 458–72.
68 See supra text accompanying nn. 43–51.
69 See supra text accompanying nn. 56–58, 64–66.
70 See e.g. supra text accompanying n. 49 (discussing the Court’s reliance on dictionary deﬁnitions in Smith, 508 U.S. at
228–29).
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demonstrate the common usage of the term in everyday language in order
to give the argument linguistic clout.71 Moreover, because both sides of
the issue are able, fairly easily, to ﬁnd linguistic support for their positions,
the ambiguity is readily apparent, and both sides are also able, fairly easily,
to turn to other forms of persuasive argument such as legislative history
and policy. We saw this in all three illustrative cases, in which the issues
were ultimately resolved based on mix of linguistics, history, and policy.72
The purpose of this article is to offer legal advocates strategies for
ﬁnding linguistic hooks for cases in which the linguistic and cognitive
collision between a client’s facts and the applicable statutory term is not
easily resolved.73 But technically in issues of statutory ambiguity have
built-in, easy-to-evoke linguistic hooks for both sides of the issue. Thus,
although technically in issues of statutory ambiguity stem from complications associated with cognitive stock structures, they are not the real
focus of this article. That is the second type of statutory ambiguity that
stems for cognitive stock structures: technically out ambiguity.
B. Technically Out Statutory Ambiguity
As the Smith, McBoyle, and Holy Trinity cases illustrate, technically in
issues of statutory ambiguity form when the item or circumstance represented by the current fact scenario technically comes within the
deﬁnitional meaning of the statutory term at issue, but does not match the
standard stock structure (i.e., prototypical meaning) of the term. In
contrast, technically out statutory ambiguity arises when the item or
circumstance represented by the current fact scenario is conceptually
close to the standard stock structure for the statutory term at issue, but
technically falls outside of both the stock structure (prototypical meaning)
and the dictionary deﬁnition (deﬁnitional meaning) of the term.
The “chair” example in the introduction is an example of technically
out statutory ambiguity.74 That example hypothesized a statute that
regulated chairs in some way and asked whether the statutory term “chair”
would include a couch.75 This issue creates a cognitive collision because
the stock structure for “couch”—a mental image of a long upholstered seat
with a backrest and armrests designed to accommodate two or more
people—is instinctively incompatible with the stock structure for “chair”—

71 See e.g. supra text accompanying nn. 44, 56, 64 (setting out quotes in which Justices of the Supreme Court evoked the
everyday usage of the terms in question in an effort to support their interpretations of those terms).
72 See supra text accompanying nn. 46, 58, 66.
73 See supra text accompanying nn. 6–9.
74 See supra text accompanying nn. 3, 6.
75 See id.
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a mental image of a seat with four legs and a backrest designed for one
person.76 Thus, the item at issue—couch—falls outside of the stock
structure for the statutory term “chair.” What’s more, the deﬁnitional
meaning of the word “chair” matches its stock structure. Webster’s
Dictionary deﬁnes “chair” as “a seat typically having four legs and a back
for one person.”77 Thus, a couch falls outside of both the stock structure
(prototypical meaning) and the technical deﬁnition (deﬁnitional meaning)
of the term “chair.”78 All that notwithstanding, however, most people
would readily admit that a couch is conceptually close to a chair. It is not
as if we were pondering whether a completely unrelated item—like a
toaster or candy bar—would be covered by a statute regulating chairs. It is
well within the realm of possibility that a legal advocate would attempt to
argue that the statutory term “chair” includes couches. And this is the
essence of technically out statutory ambiguity: the item or circumstance of
the present case falls outside of the deﬁnition and stock structure for the
relevant statutory term, but is conceptually close enough for a lawyer to
attempt to argue for its inclusion.
Oregon v. Rodriguez79 provides a more formal example of technically
out statutory ambiguity. Rodriguez involved an Oregon criminal statute
that required a court to revoke a person’s driver’s license if the person was
convicted of misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) “for a third time.”80 Defendant Rodriguez was convicted of
DUII for a fourth time, and the trial court revoked his license under this
provision.81 The issue on appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals was
whether the statutory language “convicted [of DUII] . . . for a third time”
would apply to a fourth conviction.82
The issue in Rodriguez was one of technically out statutory ambiguity.
The statutory phrase “convicted . . . for a third time” instinctively evokes
the stock structure of a conviction representing the third in a series of
convictions, with two, and only two, prior convictions. What’s more, the
dictionary deﬁnition of “third” reflects the term’s stock structure.
Webster’s Dictionary deﬁnes “third” as “being next to second in place or

76 See id.
77 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 182 (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1981).
78 This is what distinguishes technically out statutory ambiguity from technically in statutory ambiguity.
79 175 P.3d 471 (Or. App. 2007) (en banc).
80 Id. at 472–73 (quoting Or. Rev. Stat. § 809.235(1)(b) (2003)).
81 Id. at 473. Rodriguez’s driver’s license was not revoked following his third DUII conviction because that conviction had
taken place in California rather than in Oregon.
82 Id. at 472–73.
83 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 1204 (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1981).
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time.”83 Rodriguez, however, had been convicted of DUII four times. Thus,
the facts of the case—a fourth DUII conviction—technically fell outside of
the dictionary deﬁnition, and the attendant stock structure, for the
statutory term “third.” Yet the two ideas are conceptually close. A colorable
argument could be made that the word “third” in the statute meant, as a
practical matter, three or more times. In fact, the trial court judge did
revoke Rodriguez’s license under the statute after his fourth conviction.
Thus, the issue in Rodriguez presented a linguistic conundrum: the
circumstances represented by the facts of the case were conceptually close
to the statutory term, but were technically outside of it.84
Issues of technically in statutory ambiguity do not pose meaningful
linguistic problems for legal advocates.85 But issues of technically out
statutory ambiguity such as those presented in Rodriguez and the “chair”
example deﬁnitely do present legal advocates with a substantial linguistic
hurdle. In these types of issues, the circumstance represented by the
present facts is linguistically inconsistent with both the ordinary
dictionary deﬁnition and the standard stock structure for the statutory
term at issue. Indeed, in terms of these examples, it appears to be linguistically clear that a “couch” is not a “chair,” and a “fourth conviction” is not a
“third conviction.” Thus, despite their name, issues of technically out
statutory ambiguity appear to be unambiguous. Adding to the problem for
the legal advocate on the wrong side of this equation is that courts in
interpreting statutes are extremely reluctant to consider policy arguments
or other aids of construction if the language of the statute at issue appears
to be unambiguous on its face.86 Consequently, a legal advocate facing
technically out statutory ambiguity is unable to argue policy or canons of
construction without ﬁrst resolving, at least plausibly, the linguistic
mismatch between the client’s facts and the relevant statutory term. Thus,
cases of technically out statutory ambiguity present legal advocates with a
unique linguistic challenge, a challenge that legal advocates can address
with two general strategies.

84 For a discussion of how the linguistic conundrum in Rodriguez was resolved, see infra part II(A).
85 See supra text accompanying nn. 69–71.
86 E.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438 (2002) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997))
(“The ﬁrst step [in statutory construction] ‘is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning . . . . The inquiry ceases ‘if the statutory language is unambiguous . . . .’”); see generally e.g. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 396
(2009) (“If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court need not apply any rules of construction other than
to require that words and phrases be given their plain, ordinary, and usual meanings.”); 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 113 (2001)
(“As a rule, where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, . . . there is no room for judicial interpretation, and
the language should generally be given effect without resort to extrinsic guides to construction.”).
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II. New Strategies for Technically Out
Statutory Ambiguity: Evoking Favorable
Alterative Stock Structures
Issues of technically out statutory ambiguity present legal advocates with a
threshold linguistic hurdle. As Rodriguez shows, this hurdle is a product of
three contributing factors. First, in issues of this type, the item or circumstance represented by the client’s facts, although conceptually close, falls
outside of the statutory term, both linguistically and cognitively. Second,
because of this linguistic mismatch, the statutory term appears to unambiguously exclude the client’s situation from the statute’s reach. Third,
because the statutory language appears to be unambiguous, the disadvantaged advocate is prohibited, as a general matter, from arguing
extrinsic aids of construction such as policy, legislative history, canons of
construction, or persuasive judicial precedent.87 Thus, an advocate in this
situation must, as ﬁrst matter, attempt to resolve the linguistic and
cognitive collision evoked by the issue.88
The term at issue, because of its most typical linguistic usage, instinctively evokes a stock mental picture that is inconsistent with the
circumstance presented by the factual scenario. What’s more, the circumstance represented by the factual scenario is also outside of the dictionary
deﬁnition of the statutory term. Because it is unlikely that an advocate
would be successful at changing the dictionary itself, it stands to reason
that the best way for a legal advocate to attempt to resolve this discordance
is to focus on the stock structure. More speciﬁcally, the goal of an advocate
facing adverse technically out statutory ambiguity is to evoke an alternative—albeit, less instinctive—stock structure that reconciles the client’s
facts and the statutory term.
Technically out statutory ambiguity—and the two strategies that can
successfully address them—can be represented by the following formula:
(A) The statutory term
(as represented by its

≠

(B) The item or circumstance of
of present facts

stock structure and
dictionary definition)

This formula represents technically out statutory ambiguity because it
declares that A (the stock structure and dictionary deﬁnition for the
statutory term at issue) is not equal to—i.e., is inconsistent with—B (the

87 See supra text accompanying n. 85.
88 See Smith, supra n. 12, at 111–16.
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item or circumstance represented by the fact scenario). The goal of a legal
advocate facing a technically out statutory ambiguity is to solve this
formula by making the two sides equal—that is, by somehow making B
(the facts) ﬁt into—i.e., be consistent with—A (the statutory term).
Mathematically, a formula such as this can be reconciled in one of two
ways: by addressing either the left side or the right side of the formula. The
ﬁrst strategy focuses on the left side of the equation—the statutory term—
and explores methods by which an advocate can evoke an alternative
(perhaps secondary) stock structure for that term that is consistent with the
client’s facts. The second strategy focuses on the right side of the
equation—the item implicated by the facts—and explores methods by
which an advocate can evoke deep-seated stock experiences that demonstrate that the item is, upon closer refection, consistent with the statutory
term.
A. Strategy 1: Evoking an Alternative Stock Structure
for the Statutory Term
The ﬁrst strategy for resolving the cognitive collision presented by issues
of technically out statutory ambiguity is to evoke an alternative, more
favorable, stock structure for the statutory term itself. This strategy
focuses on the left side of the formula by attempting to alter, or at least add
to, the cognitive image instinctively evoked by the statutory term.
Whereas a word or phrase may evoke a standard stock structure
based on its most common usage, a word or phrase may also have a subordinate stock structure based on a use that is less common. A subordinate
stock structure would be an idealized, generic mental image a person
thinks of once that person is reminded of an alternative, less common use
of a word or phrase. Many words have multiple uses. Moreover, many, if
not most, of a word’s uses are reflected in the dictionary, as many
dictionary entries contain multiple deﬁnitions.89 But with technically out
statutory issues, the item represented by the present case does not fall
within any dictionary deﬁnition of the statutory term.90 Consequently, the
challenge for a legal advocate in this situation is to evoke an alternative use
of the statutory term that is recognizable to most people (like judges) even
though it is not included within any of the dictionary deﬁnitions for that
word.

89 See e.g. Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 17a (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1981) (explaining generally how the different
deﬁnitions (or senses) of a word are organized within the dictionary entry for that word).
90 See supra pt. I(B). If the dictionary supports the alternative use of the word, a statutory issue based on that word would
be one of technically in statutory ambiguity, not technically out statutory ambiguity. The issue would be one of technically
in statutory ambiguity because although the statutory term is outside of the standard stock structure for the term, it would
nevertheless be within the dictionary deﬁnition of the term.
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The “chair” hypothetical once again provides an example of this
strategy. Say an advocate was attempting to demonstrate that a couch falls
under a statute regulating “chairs.”91 The word “chair,” based on its most
common usage, evokes the standard stock structure of a piece of furniture
for a single person to sit on.92 The entry for the word “chair” in the
dictionary includes this most common use as well as a number of other
less common uses.93 None of the dictionary deﬁnitions for “chair,”
however, are broad enough to include a couch.94 Thus, the only way for the
advocate to resolve the linguistic mismatch between a couch and the word
“chair” is to evoke a favorable subordinate stock structure from everyday
language. Of course, the rub is that the alternative use of the term “chair”
must be recognizable to the average person even though it is not common
enough to have been included in the dictionary.
One strategy the advocate may be able to employ is to focus on the
use of the word “chair” in casual conversation as a generic word for “seat.”
Along these lines, the advocate could evoke the typical family reunion or
living-room meeting. Often in this setting, the advocate could point out,
the person in charge will ask everyone to “have a chair,” even though the
room contains a limited number of chairs as well as a couple of couches.95
(Are you picturing it? Yes? There’s your stock structure for this use.)
Clearly in this context—an everyday context—the word “chair”
includes couches. No one in this situation would think that the person
making the announcement meant that only the chairs should be used and
that the rest of the people should stand.96 Yet, this use of “chair”—as a
synonym for “seat”—is not reflected in the dictionary.97 Thus, conjuring
up this use of the word “chair” evokes an alternative stock structure for the
word that is beyond the word’s standard stock structure and dictionary
deﬁnition, yet is recognizable and, most important, broad enough to
include a couch. In the context of the chair hypothetical, then, an advocate
could evoke this alternative use of the word “chair” in an effort to offer a
plausible linguistic resolution to the initial cognitive collision between a
couch and the statutory term. With this alternative stock structure, the

91 See supra text accompanying nn. 3, 73–77.
92 See supra text accompanying nn. 3, 75.
93 See Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 182 (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1981).
94 See id.
95 This illustration is adapted from Tiersma, supra note 1, at 455.
96 See id.
97 See Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 182 (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1981). The deﬁnition that most closely reflects this
use deﬁnes “chair” as “any of the various devices that hold up or support.” Id. However, this deﬁnition is too vague to clearly
cover the use of the word “chair” as a synonym for “seat.”
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advocate could demonstrate that the term “chair,” as it relates to a couch, is
not so unambiguous as it ﬁrst seemed. Thus, this alternative stock
structure could serve as a linguistic hook that would enable the advocate
to turn to other (more persuasive) forms of statutory argument, such as
policy and legislative history.
I know what you are thinking: Referring to a word’s usage in an
informal context such as a living-room meeting is a bit too contrived to
have any persuasive force in a formal legal matter.98 But this informal
strategy has had much success in many real cases. Here are three recent
examples:
1. Oregon v. Rodriguez 99 revisited

Rodriguez, which challenged the revocation of the appellant’s driver’s
license for his fourth DUII conviction under a statute that authorized
revocation if the driver was convicted “for a third time,”100 presented the
issue whether the term “third” conviction would include a “fourth”
conviction.101
The Oregon Court of Appeals heard the appeal en banc.102 In the end,
a majority of the judges (eight of ten) held that the statutory language
“convicted of [DUII] for a third time” did apply to the defendant’s fourth
conviction and afﬁrmed the revocation of his driver’s license.103 The two
dissenting judges, Judge Sercombe and Judge Wollheim, took the more
instinctive position on the issue (i.e., the position consistent with the
standard stock structure and dictionary deﬁnition of the word “third”):
“a . . . reference to the ‘third conviction’ of a person or a conviction for ‘a
third time’ means the conviction that follows the ﬁrst and second
convictions in time.”104 Based primarily on this linguistic mismatch, the
dissenting judges argued that the statutory language “convicted of [DUII]
. . . for a third time” did not apply to the defendant’s fourth DUII
conviction.105
The majority, however, took a dramatically different approach:
At the initial level of the analysis, we are to examine the words of the
statute in context to determine whether the disputed provision is
“ambiguous,” that is, whether the provision is capable of more than one
reasonable construction. If it is, we then proceed to the legislative

98 This concern will be addressed in much more detail
later. See infra pt. III.
99 175 P.3d 471.
100 Id. at 472–73.
101 Id.

102 Id. at 471–72.
103 Id. at 478.
104 Id. at 481 (Sercombe, J., joined by Wollheim, J.,
dissenting).
105 See id. at 478–85 (Sercombe, J., joined by Wollheim, J.,
dissenting).
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history, and if the legislative history does not resolve that ambiguity, we
resort to relevant canons of construction. . . . It is important to
emphasize how little it takes to demonstrate that a statute is
“ambiguous.” As we explained in Godfrey v. Fred Meyer Stores, 202 Or.
App. 673, 686, 124 P.3d 621 (2005), rev. den., 340 Or. 672, 136 P.3d 742
(2006)[,] “[T]he threshold of ambiguity is a low one. It does not require
that competing constructions be equally tenable. It requires only that a
competing construction not be ‘wholly implausible.’ Owens v. MVD, 319
Or. 259, 268, 875 P.2d 463 (1994)[.]”
*****
In this case, the question is what the legislature intended by the
reference to a person having been convicted of misdemeanor DUII “for a
third time.” More precisely, the question is—at least initially—whether
there is more than one construction of that provision that is not “wholly
implausible.” Owens, 319 Or. at 268, 875 P.2d 463.
The answer to that question is straightforward. The statute is at
least ambiguous. In ordinary speech, references to numeric sequences
can mean a variety of things. . . . To pick a silly example, when you tell
your child, “if you do that one more time, you are grounded,” that admonition does not necessarily mean that grounding will follow one—and
only one—offense. To cite another, to tell the child that he or she may
have “seconds” does not necessarily mean that the child cannot have a
third or fourth helping. The precise meaning of the numeric reference
depends on the context in which it is employed.
*****
So, to return to the wording of [this statute], there is nothing in the
phrasing of the provision referring to a defendant having been convicted
of misdemeanor DUII “for a third time” that necessarily means that the
statute applies to a third—and only third—conviction. Reading the
statute to apply to a third and subsequent convictions is, in other words,
not wholly implausible.106

With this reasoning, the majority found enough ambiguity in the
statutory provision to turn to other forms of statutory analysis.
Speciﬁcally, the majority moved on to analyze the issue from three other
perspectives: by looking to comparable Oregon statutes that contained
similar numeric references,107 by reviewing the provision’s legislative
history,108 and by applying several canons of statutory construction.109 The
majority ultimately concluded as follows: “We conclude that the phrasing

106 Id. at 473–74 (quotation formatting modiﬁed).

108 Id. at 475–76.

107 Id. at 474–75.

109 Id. at 476–77.
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of [the statute] is ambiguous but that resort to legislative history and other
aids to construction make clear that the trial court did not err in interpreting the statute to require permanent revocation of defendant’s driving
privileges based on his three prior misdemeanor DUII convictions.”110
The majority’s approach to the issue in Rodriguez is as a textbook
example of how an advocate facing a technically out statutory issue can
successfully overcome the threshold cognitive and linguistic dilemma
presented by the issue. In fact, several important observations can be
gleaned from the majority’s approach. In this context we will view the
Rodriguez majority as an “advocate” who advocated its position on the
issue through its published opinion.111
First, an issue of technically out statutory ambiguity poses a signiﬁcant
linguistic hurdle for an advocate because, on its face, the relevant statutory
language appears to unambiguously exclude the item or circumstance
represented by the client’s facts. Furthermore, because the statutory
language appears to be unambiguous, an advocate in most jurisdictions
would be barred from arguing extrinsic aids of construction. We see this
exact dilemma in Rodriguez. The statutory reference to a “third”
conviction appeared on its face to unambiguously exclude a fourth
conviction. Moreover, as the majority pointed out, Oregon law does not
permit the use of extrinsic aids of construction when the provision in
question is unambiguous.112 Consequently, the majority (as an advocate
for its position) was forced as an initial matter to ﬁnd (or construct!)
ambiguity where there appeared to be none.
Second, in its effort to ﬁnd statutory ambiguity, the majority looked
past the dictionary deﬁnition of the word “third”113 (and its attendant
stock structure) and evoked alternative uses of numeric references from
everyday language. Speciﬁcally, the majority gave examples (self-described
“silly” examples) of how a person, in an everyday situation, may use a
speciﬁc numeric reference to mean that number or more.114 These
allusions force the reader of the majority’s opinion to conjure up mental

110 Id. at 478.
111 Once a judge makes a decision in a case, the judge becomes an “advocate” for the purpose of selling his or her decision
to the various audiences of that decision. Consequently, a judicial opinion is undoubtedly a form of persuasive writing. See
e.g. Smith, supra n. 12, at 5–6 (discussing “Judicial Opinions as Examples of Persuasive Writing”).
112 See Rodriguez, 175 P.3d at 473–74.
113 Interestingly, the majority claimed to ﬁnd support for its position in the following dictionary deﬁnitions of the word
“third”: “being number three in a countable series” and “being the last in each group of three in a series.” Id. at 474.
However, I am unable to see how either of these deﬁnitions supports interpreting the word “third” to include a “fourth” of
something. Thus, despite this contention by the majority, I do not think that the dictionary offered any support for the
majority’s decision. In my opinion, the issue in Rodriguez was a clear example of technically out statutory ambiguity.
114 Id.
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stock structures for these alternative uses of numeric references. Once
these alternative stock structures are evoked in the reader’s mind, the
reader is able to envision an alternative use of the word “third” that would
mean three or more times. Thus, the majority was able to evoke an alternative use of the word “third” from everyday language that would be broad
enough to include a fourth conviction.115
Third, by evoking favorable alternative stock structures for numeric
references, the majority was able to establish at least a modicum of
ambiguity in the relevant statutory provision. As the majority itself noted,
“[T]he threshold of ambiguity is a low one.”116 Thus, all the majority
needed was a linguistic hook—that is, an alternative use of the word
“third” that would plausibly reconcile the instinctive linguistic and
cognitive collision presented by the issue before it. The majority found this
linguistic hook in its “silly” examples from common language.
Finally, because the majority was able to establish another use of the
term “third” that was not “wholly implausible,”117 and because this
alterative use rendered the statute plausibly ambiguous, the majority was
allowed to turn to other forms of statutory analysis in its effort to resolve
this ambiguity.118 With the door open, the majority turned to comparable
statutes, legislative history, and canons of construction.119 The majority
was able to make a number of persuasive arguments based on these other
sources of authority. In the end, the majority made a convincing case for
its conclusion that the statutory requirement of a “third conviction”
included the defendant’s fourth conviction.120 And it all started with
majority’s evocation of informal alternative stock structures that plausibly
reconciled the initial cognitive collision posed by the statutory issue.
2. The Work Connection, Inc., v. Bui 121

The Bui case involved a Minnesota unemployment-beneﬁts statute that
required all recipients of beneﬁts to be “available for suitable
employment.”122 The statute further stated that to be “available for suitable
employment” meant that the person must, among other things, “have
transportation throughout the labor market area.”123 Mr. Bui’s employer
contested Mr. Bui’s right to beneﬁts under this statute because Mr. Bui
relied on public transportation. According to the employer, Mr. Bui was
limited to those locations serviced by public transportation, and thus he

115 See id.

120 See id.

116 Id. (quoting Godfrey, 124 P.3d at 628).

121 749 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. App. 2008).

117 See id.

122 Id. at 67.

118 See id. at 474–78.

123 Id. (emphasis added).

119 See id.

124 Id. at 64–65.
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did not have transportation “throughout” the labor-market area as
required by the statute.124 Despite the employer’s argument, an unemployment-law judge found that Mr. Bui did qualify for unemployment
beneﬁts.125 The employer appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
The main issue on appeal was whether the Mr. Bui’s transportation via
public conveyances qualiﬁed as having transportation “throughout” the
labor-market area.126
A majority of the court ultimately held in favor of Mr. Bui.127 The case
is more understandable, though, if we begin with the dissenting opinion.
In a lone dissent on the main issue, Judge Schellhas argued the dictionary
deﬁnition and standard stock structure for the word “throughout”:
The unemployment-beneﬁts statutes are unambiguous. . . . [T]he plain
meaning of “throughout” . . . is the dictionary deﬁnition, “[I]n, to,
through, or during every part of; all through.” The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language 1436 (4th ed.2000). “Throughout” is
not reasonably subject to more than one interpretation; therefore, it is
not ambiguous . . . [A]pplying that deﬁnition in this case, the issue is
whether Bui had transportation “in, to, through, or during every part of ”
or “all through” his labor market area. If reliance on public transportation does not provide access to “every part of ” Bui’s labor market
area, or “all through” his labor market area, Bui does not have “transportation throughout the labor market area” and therefore is not
“available for suitable employment” under [the statute].128

Based on this reasoning, Judge Schellhas concluded that Mr. Bui was
not eligible for unemployment beneﬁts.129
The majority took a different approach. After acknowledging that
courts are limited to the plain meaning of statutory terms when there is no
ambiguity,130 the majority went on to discover ambiguity regarding the
statute’s use of the word “throughout.”131 More speciﬁcally, the majority
pointed out that in informal contexts, the word “throughout” is often used
to mean “various locales representative of the whole.”132 The majority
proved this point with the following informal example: “[I]f someone
states that she has traveled ‘throughout’ Wisconsin, it does not indicate

125 Id. at 65.
126 Id. at 65–67.
127 Id. at 72–73.

portation throughout the labor market area, and Bui failed
to satisfy that requirement. Therefore, he was not available
for suitable employment and is not eligible for unemployment beneﬁts.”).

128 Id. at 74 (Schellhas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

130 Id. at 68.

129 Id. at 75 (Schellhas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Bui was required to have trans-

132 Id. at 69.

131 See id. at 68–69.
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that she has visited every place within the state, but that she has been ‘all
around’ the state or, restated, to locations that are representative of its
various parts.”133
Having proved that the word “throughout” was subject to more than
one interpretation, the majority held that the term was at least
ambiguous.134 The majority then turned to other forms of statutory
analysis in its effort to resolve the ambiguity.135 After reviewing the
provision’s legislative and administrative history136 and some canons of
statutory construction,137 the majority ultimately concluded that “[Bui’s]
reliance on public transit [was] adequate to satisfy the requirement of
transportation throughout the labor market area, and that [Bui] [was]
therefore eligible for unemployment compensation.”138
Like Rodriguez, Bui illustrates how an advocate can overcome technically out statutory ambiguity by evoking from everyday language an
informal alternative use of the statutory term in question that plausibly
reconciles the apparent mismatch between the facts of the present case
and the statutory term. As they did in both of these cases, alternative stock
structures such as these can provide enough of a linguistic hook to open
the analysis up to other, more persuasive forms of statutory argument.
3. Pennsylvania v. McCoy139

James McCoy entered a Philadelphia restaurant and, after arguing with the
manager, ﬁred ﬁve shots from a handgun in the direction of the
manager.140 Mr. McCoy ﬁred all ﬁve shots while he was standing inside the
restaurant.141 Mr. McCoy was convicted of several crimes, including
“discharge of a ﬁrearm into an occupied structure.”142 The primary issue

133 Id. It is important to note that the majority in Bui
claimed to ﬁnd support in the dictionary for this alternative
use of “throughout.” The majority pointed out that the
dictionary deﬁned “throughout” as “[i]n, to, through, or
during every part of; all through.” Id. (quoting The
American Heritage College Dictionary 1436 (4th ed.,
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2002)). Building on the latter
deﬁnition, “all through,” the majority then went on to the
deﬁnition of the word “through”: “Here and there in;
around.” Id. (quoting The American Heritage College
Dictionary 1436 (4th ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
2002)). The majority claimed that a combination of the
deﬁnitions of “throughout” and “through” supported interpreting the word “throughout” to mean “various locales
representative of the whole.” Id. This reasoning, however, is
unconvincing. The majority relied heavily on the deﬁnition
of the word “through” in isolation. But the deﬁnition of
“throughout” does not use “through” in isolation; it uses the
phrase “all through.” Id. (quoting The American Heritage
College Dictionary 1436 (4th ed., Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt 2002)) (emphasis added). Though the word

“through” may offer some flexibility, the phrase “all
through” does not. Thus, while the majority claimed to ﬁnd
support in the dictionary, its real support was its reference
to the informal use of the word “throughout” in everyday
conversation, as illustrated by the majority’s Wisconsin
example. See id. This informal use in everyday language is
real, undeniable, and familiar. Thus, it was the majority’s
allusion to this informal use—not the dictionary
deﬁnition—that evokes in the reader’s mind the plausible
alternative stock structure for the word “throughout.”
134 Id.
135 See id. at 69–72.
136 Id. at 70–71.
137 Id. at 71–72.
138 Id. at 72–73 (citation omitted).
139 962 A.2d 1160 (Pa. 2009).
140 Id. at 1161.
141 Id.
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on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether Mr. McCoy’s
conviction for shooting “into an occupied structure”143 should be reversed
because he had ﬁred his gun while he was already inside the restaurant.144
The issue in McCoy was one of technically out statutory ambiguity.
The statutory phrase “discharging a ﬁrearm into an occupied structure”
immediately evokes the mental stock structure of a person situated
outside of a building and shooting into it. What’s more, the dictionary
deﬁnition of the word “into” reflects this standard usage.145 Mr. McCoy,
however, ﬁred his shots from within the structure. Thus, the facts of the
case cognitively collided with the statutory provision.
Four of the six Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices relied on the
standard stock structure and dictionary deﬁnition of the word “into”:
The plain meaning of “into” can be gleaned from its dictionary
deﬁnition. The word “into” typically follows “a verb that carries the idea
of motion . . . to indicate a place or thing . . . enterable or penetrable by or
as if by a movement from the outside to the interior part.” Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 1184 (1986). It is also deﬁned as
describing action “from the outside to the inside of; toward and within.”
Webster’s New World Dictionary 738 (2d ed. 1984). Based upon these
deﬁnitions, in the context of spatial relations, the plain meaning of the
term “into” requires that the original location is outside of the destination—one does not walk “into” a room one is already standing in;
likewise, a gun is not ﬁred “into” a building when the shooter is located
inside the building. A projectile only travels “into” an occupied structure
when the projectile begins its journey outside of the structure and either
enters the structure through an opening or penetrates the outer wall.146

The majority built on this “plain meaning” argument by turning to
several canons of statutory construction.147 In the end, the majority
concluded as follows:
The language of [the statute], fairly interpreted in light of our principles of statutory construction, requires that an actor be located outside
of an occupied structure in order to ﬁre “into” that structure. Here, it was

142 Id. (quoting 18 PA. Consol. Stat. § 2707.1)
143 962 A.2d at 1161 (quoting 18 Pa. Consol. Stat. §
2707.1) (emphasis added).
144 Id.
145 See Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 600 (G. & C.
Merriam Co. 1981) (explaining in the relevant deﬁnition
that the word “into” is “used as a function word to indicate
entry, introduction, insertion, or inclusion ‘came [into] the
house’”).

146 McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1166–67. Arguably, the majority
could have found that McCoy shot “into” the structure if
one or more of his bullets had embedded into an interior
wall of the structure (i.e., had embedded “into” a wall in the
restaurant). However, there was no evidence of this in the
case. Compare infra text accompanying nn. 151–57
(discussing North Carolina v. Canady, 664 S.E.2d 380 (N.C.
App. 2008)).
147 See id. at 1167–69.
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undisputed that appellant [McCoy] was inside the structure. According,
we reverse appellant’s conviction under [this statute].148

Of more interest to this discussion is the dissent in McCoy. Two
dissenting justices—Justices Eakin and McCaffery—argued that the word
“into” is sometimes used in everyday language in a way that goes beyond
its standard use and dictionary deﬁnition. According to Justices Eakin and
McCaffery,
“Into” may denote moving from outside in, but one may move “into”
a room even when one is within the room to start with. One moves into
the night even when one was in the night to start with. One may proceed
into the jungle despite being in the jungle already. One may introduce
thoughts into the dialog that is ongoing. One need not be outside the
room, night, jungle, or dialog to have the word “into” be descriptive, and
one need not be outside the building to shoot “into” it.149

With this argument, the dissenting justices offered an informal alternative stock structure for the word “into” that would encompass McCoy’s
conduct of shooting from within the restaurant. Although the dissenting
justices were unable to persuade enough of their colleagues to determine
the result in the case, their efforts in the dissenting opinion nevertheless
provide another compelling example of the ﬁrst strategy for overcoming
technically out statutory ambiguity.
It is interesting to compare the McCoy case to the factually similar
case of North Carolina v. Canady.150 Canady involved an issue of technically in rather than technically out ambiguity. The slight difference
between the cases highlights the difference between these two types of
statutory ambiguity.
In Canady, the defendant ﬁred a handgun from outside an apartment
building, and the bullet lodged in an exterior wall of the building.151 The
defendant was convicted of “discharging a ﬁrearm into occupied
property.”152 On appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the
defendant argued that “in order to be ‘into’ the [building], as the plain
meaning of ‘into’ is commonly understood, the bullet must penetrate an
interior wall of the apartment, or enter the apartment.”153 The court
disagreed, relying on an alternative deﬁnition of “into” from the
dictionary:

148 Id. at 1169.

151 Id. at 382.

149 Id. at 1170 (Eakin, J., joined by McCaffery, J.,
dissenting).

152 Id. at 383.

150 664 S.E.2d 380 (N.C. App. 2008).

153 Id. at 384.
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[T]he plain meaning of “into” includes “against” as in “crashed into a
tree.” American Heritage College Dictionary 712 (3d ed. 1997) (emphasis
added). This sentence does not mean “crashed through a tree.” Similarly,
discharging a ﬁrearm “into” an enclosure does not have to mean
“through” the wall of the enclosure. . . . The exterior wall is nonetheless a
wall, which the bullet was ﬁred against, thereby fulﬁlling the requirement
of being ﬁred “into” the enclosure.154

The issue in Canady was similar to the issue in McCoy; however, for
purposes of linguistic ambiguity, the two cases are very different.
Although the facts of the Canady case conflicted with the standard stock
structure for the phrase “discharging a ﬁrearm into occupied property,” the
court in Canady was able nevertheless to turn to the dictionary to support
its alternative interpretation of the word “into.” Thus, the issue in Canday
was one of technically in statutory ambiguity, and, as with all issues of
technically in statutory ambiguity,155 the dictionary itself provided the
linguistic hook needed to open the issue up to extrinsic aids statutory
construction.156 By contrast, the dissenting justices in McCoy could not
turn to the dictionary for support for their interpretation of the word
“into” because their interpretation was not reflected in the dictionary.
Thus, the issue in McCoy was one of technically out statutory ambiguity,
and the dissenting judges had to create a linguistic hook from a lesscommon usage of the word “into” that was beyond the word’s dictionary
deﬁnition.
B. Strategy 2: Evoking Alternative Stock Experiences Regarding
the Item or Circumstance Represented by Client’s Facts
The ﬁrst strategy for overcoming adverse cognitive stock structures
implicated by statutory language focused on the left side of the mathematical formula157 and explored the technique of an advocate evoking an
alternative, more favorable stock structure for the statutory term itself.
The second strategy, explored in this section, focuses of the right side of
our formula. More speciﬁcally, the second strategy for overcoming adverse
stock structures in issues of technically out statutory ambiguity involves
evoking in the reader’s mind favorable stock experiences regarding the
item or concept represented by the present case. This strategy, too, is best
explained through illustrations.

154 Id.

156 See Canady, 664 S.E.2d at 384–85.

155 See supra pt. I(A).

157 See supra introduction to pt. II.
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1. Covered Bridge, Inc. v. Town of Vail158

A building owner in Vail, Colorado, appealed a district judge’s determination that a unit in the owner’s building was “street level” for the
purposes of zoning classiﬁcation.159 Because of the slope of the fronting
street, the unit in question was situated four feet above the surface of the
street and was accessed by ascending a short flight of stairs.160 The issue
on appeal was whether the zoning classiﬁcation “street level” applied to a
real-estate unit four feet above the level of the street.161
The issue in Covered Bridge was one of technically out statutory
ambiguity. The standard stock structure for “street level” is a mental
picture of a real-estate unit abutting, and situated at the same elevation as,
the street. The building owner’s unit, however, was four feet above the
street and thus did not ﬁt the standard stock structure for the zoning term.
The Colorado Court of Appeals ultimately held that the unit was “street
level.”162 In reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged and resolved
the linguistic mismatch between the statutory term and the facts of the
case:
Plaintiff points out . . . that, in the dictionary, “street” is commonly
deﬁned as “a paved road” and “a public thoroughfare especially in a city,
town, or village, including all areas within the right of way,” see Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 2259, and “level” is deﬁned, as
relevant here, as “an approximately horizontal line or surface” and “such
a line or surface taken as an index of altitude,” id. at 1300. From these
deﬁnitions, “street level” would be that index of altitude approximately
horizontal to the adjacent thoroughfare. Accepting such deﬁnitions, we
agree that it would not be unreasonable to interpret the term “street
level” as the building level that is exactly equal in elevation to the
relevant street. . . .
However, . . . we agree with the town that it also is reasonable to
read the term “street level” to refer to a range of building levels that are
approximately equal in elevation to the street, but slightly elevated by the
presence of a curb or a small number of steps, that is, levels within
reasonable horizontal proximity to, and having direct pedestrian access
from, the street even though not situated at the exact same elevation as
the adjacent street.
*****

158 197 P.3d 281 (Colo. App. 2008).

161 Id.

159 Id. at 282–83.

162 Id. at 285.

160 Id. at 282.
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[I]t is undisputed that the town is located in mountainous terrain
and the topography of the relevant section of Bridge Street varies considerably. Unless building levels slope in exact concert with the ever
changing elevation of the adjacent street, there might be only one small
spot, or perhaps none at all, where a building level would ﬁt plaintiff ’s
deﬁnition of “street level.”163

Having by this discussion resolved the issue from a linguistic
standpoint, the court went on to explain how a narrow approach to the
term “street level” would undermine the statute’s purpose and lead to
absurd results.164 The court concluded by afﬁrming the district court
judge’s ruling that the owner’s unit was to be zoned as “street level.”165
The most important part of this discussion for linguistic purposes is
the last quoted paragraph, in which the court explained that, in mountainous terrain, buildings rarely slope with the grade of the adjacent street.
As the court explained, buildings in mountain towns remain level, and
often only a small portion of any given building is at the same elevation as
the adjacent street. The reason this discussion is important is that it cognitively triggers in the minds of the readers their past experiences with
streets in mountain towns. This dispute arose in the mountain town of
Vail, Colorado. The appeals court sat in Colorado as well. Thus, everyone
involved in this matter—from the parties to the judges—were Coloradans.
Most, if not all, people who live in Colorado are familiar with the unique
architectural designs of buildings situated on streets with a substantial
grade. Based on these experiences, these people have formed stock
memories of this phenomenon. The court’s discussion in Covered Bridge
evokes these stock memories and allows the reader to remember and
appreciate that in the case of a mountain town, a “street level” shop or
store may mean a shop or store that is slightly above the street and thus
serves to resolve in the reader’s mind the apparent mismatch between the
facts of the case and instinctive linguistic meaning of the relevant
statutory term.
This strategy is signiﬁcantly different from the ﬁrst strategy, which
focused on the left side of the mathematical formula: the statutory term.
That strategy focused on the technique of evoking a favorable alternative
meaning for the statutory term itself. This second strategy focuses on the
right side of the formula: the item represented by the facts of the present
case. In the Covered Bridge case, the court did not evoke alternative uses
or meanings of the statutory term “street level.” Rather, the court focused

163 Id. at 284–85.
164 Id.

165 Id. at 285.
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on the plaintiff ’s building and buildings like it. The court resolved the
apparent linguistic conflict by reminding the reader of the unique nature
of buildings on sloped streets. The court thus resolved the linguistic
conflict by explaining how the facts of the case, upon closer inspection,
were actually consistent with the statutory term.
2. Colorado v. Walters166 and Grabler v. Allen167

In Colorado v. Walters, three individuals entered the trailer part of a
parked semitractor-trailer rig and stole several cases of beer.168 The individuals were subsequently convicted of ﬁrst-degree criminal trespass.169
The relevant criminal statute made it unlawful to enter “any motor vehicle
with the intent to steal anything of value.”170 The defendants appealed their
conviction, arguing, among other things, that the trailer part of a semitractor-trailer was not a “motor vehicle.”171
The Walters appeal presented an issue of technically out statutory
ambiguity. The standard stock structure for “motor vehicle” is a mental
picture of a generic stand-alone, self-propelled vehicle without an attached
trailer. Furthermore, the Colorado statutory deﬁnition of “motor vehicle”
was consistent with this stock structure. It deﬁned “motor vehicle” for the
purpose of the criminal code as “any self-propelled device by which
persons or property may be moved, carried, or transported from one place
to another.”172 The facts of the case, however, were inconsistent with the
stock structure and the statutory deﬁnition. The defendants had entered
the trailer part of the rig, not the “self-propelled”–tractor part. Thus, the
real issue in Walters was whether the term “motor vehicle” included an
attached trailer.
The State’s primary argument on this issue was that the two parts of a
semitractor-trailer represent a single entity and thus overall should be
treated as a single motor vehicle.173 The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed
with the State: “We agree with the People’s argument that the subject
vehicle, although composed of two separable parts, represent[ed] one
commercial unit.”174 And with this rather brief line of reasoning, the court
held that the semitrailer, which at the time of the crime was attached to a
tractor, qualiﬁed as a “motor vehicle” for the purposes of the ﬁrst-degree
criminal-trespass statute.175
Although the State’s argument on this issue was rather brief and
simplistic, it contained (perhaps unbeknownst to the State) a powerful
166 568 P.2d 61 (Colo. App. 1977).

171 Id.

167 109 P.3d 1047 (Colo. App. 2005).

172 Id. (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-901(3)(k) (1973)).

168 568 P.2d at 63.

173 See id.

169 Id.

174 Id.

170 Id. at 64 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-502 (1973)).

175 Id.
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cognitive persuasive strategy. When the State argued that the two parts of
a tractor-trailer are really one unit, the State automatically triggered in the
minds of the judges generic memories of their experiences with these
types of vehicles. First, it is safe to assume that the judges knew, like most
people, that the tractor part of a semirig is designed and built speciﬁcally
to tow the trailer part. Thus, like the rest of us, the judges had a generic
understanding and picture of the relationship between the two parts of a
semirig. Second, assuming again that the judges were like most of us, their
real-life experiences with tractor-trailers were probably limited to seeing
them on the highway. Thus, the State’s reference had the effect of evoking
in the judges’ minds stock memories of tractor-trailers driving down the
road. More important, the reference also evoked in the judges’ minds
stock memories of seeing just the tractor part of a tractor-trailer rig
driving down the highway. We have all seen it: a tractor driving down the
highway without its trailer. Admit it: they look funny; front-heavy; “naked”
even. Most people would agree that the tractor part of a semirig looks
incomplete without an attached trailer. Thus, when the State argued that a
tractor and trailer are one unit, the State, whether it knew it or not, evoked
potent stock memories that conﬁrmed that assertion. In the end, those
stock memories were powerful enough to resolve in the judges’ minds the
initial linguistic and cognitive disconnect posed by the issue on appeal.
More than twenty-ﬁve years after Walters, the Colorado Court
Appeals, in Grabler v. Allen, again faced the technically out statutory issue
of whether a trailer attached to a motor vehicle qualiﬁed as a “motor
vehicle” for the purposes of a Colorado statute. In Grabler, a student
volunteer, who was driving a private pickup truck that was towing a trailer
owned by Colorado State University, collided with the plaintiff ’s automobile.176 The plaintiff sued the university (and the student) for
negligence.177 The university moved to dismiss the suit, contending that it
was immune from liability under the Colorado Governmental Immunity
Act (GIA).178 The plaintiff argued that the university’s immunity was
waived because the student was operating a university “motor vehicle” at
the time of the accident.179 The GIA waived a public entity’s immunity
from tort actions “for injuries resulting from . . . [t]he operation of a motor
vehicle owned or leased by such public entity.”180 (The GIA did not deﬁne
the term “motor vehicle.”181) The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and

176 Grabler, 109 P.3d at 1048.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 1049.

180 Id. (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-106(1)(a) (2004)
(emphasis added)).
181 Id.
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denied the motion to dismiss.182 The defendants appealed.183 The issue on
appeal was whether, for the purposes of the GIA, the student was driving a
“motor vehicle owned by [the university]” when she was driving a private
pickup truck towing a university-owned trailer.184
The plaintiff relied heavily on the Walters case. Speciﬁcally, the
plaintiff argued that just like a semitractor-trailer, which was held to be a
single commercial unit and thus a motor vehicle in Walters, the
truck–trailer combination in this case was “one motor vehicle unit of
which CSU was an owner.”185 The appellate court, however, was not
persuaded by this argument.186 Although the court did not expressly state
why it rejected this argument, we can surmise the reason for ourselves.
The plaintiff ’s argument based on Walters was unconvincing because the
reference to a truck–trailer combination does not evoke the same stock
memories as a reference to a tractor-trailer combination. The latter
reference evokes stock memories of both the combined unit and the
incomplete nature of a lone tractor. A reference to a truck–trailer combination does not have the same effect. Unlike semitractors, pickup trucks
often appear without trailers. Moreover, while pickup trucks can tow
trailers, they still serve common functions (transporting people or hauling
materials) when they are not towing trailers. Perhaps most important, a
pickup truck does not look incomplete without a trailer. Thus, a
truck–trailer combination is not instinctively viewed as a single unit in the
manner that a tractor-trailer combination is.
Even though the court did not see a parallel to Walters, it did nevertheless rule in favor of the plaintiff. It did so in large part by evoking on its
own accord different stock experiences that were favorable to the plaintiff.
Despite the length of its opinion, the Grabler court’s reasoning boils down
to a single paragraph.187 At the heart of its opinion, the court stated the
following:
Here the trailer was being used in the manner that was intended
because it was being towed by a motor vehicle. . . . [O]nce the trailer was
attached to the motor vehicle, it is reasonable to assume the trailer
affected the operation and handling of the motor vehicle towing it.
Additionally, when, as here, a motor vehicle and trailer are joined

182 Id.
183 Id.
184 See id.
185 Appellee’s Answer Brief, Grabler v. Allen, 2004 WL
5259584 at *8 (Mar. 24, 2004) (No. 03CA1246, 109 P.3d
1047).

186 The court discusses Walters in passing, but does not
apply it. See Grabler, 109 P.3d at 1050.
187 Most of the court’s opinion in Grabler involves the
court summarizing similar cases from Colorado and a
number of other jurisdictions. See Grabler, 109 P.3d at
1049–50. However, in the end, the court does not use any
of these cases as the basis for its conclusion. See id. at
1050–51.
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together and are traveling down a highway, the combined vehicle is
perceived by others as one vehicle because the combined vehicle accelerates, turns, and slows down as one unit.188

That’s it. That is the sum total of the court’s reasoning on the issue.
With this reasoning, the court colluded that the truck–trailer combination
was a “motor vehicle” under the GIA.189 The court held that the
defendants were not immune from liability and remanded the case for
trial.190
A close reading of the above quote reveals that the court relied on two
primary rationales in reaching its conclusion. First, the court pointed out
that the trailer likely affected the operation of the pickup truck. This is a
policy argument: Because the trailer affected the operation of the vehicle,
and because the vehicle, with its operation so affected, hit another
motorist, it is only reasonable to treat the truck–trailer combination as a
single unit.
The second rationale is of more interest. In the ﬁnal sentence of the
quote, the court noted that the truck–trailer combination moved as one
and would be perceived by others as one vehicle. Simple? Yes. Trivial? No.
With this sentence, the court (as an advocate for its conclusion) triggers
stock experiences in the mind of the reader that reconcile the cognitive
and linguistic mismatch posed by the issue. With this sentence, the court
evokes in the mind of the reader stock memories of seeing truck–trailer
combinations moving down the road. We have all seen this: the two parts
moving smoothly as one—changing lanes together; slowing down
together; turning corners together. The court’s comment causes us to
conjure up these experiences, and these experiences and the stock
memories they generate cause us the view truck–trailer combinations as
single units. Thus, with this simple sentence, the court persuades its
readers to view a truck–trailer combination as a single “motor vehicle.”
Walters and Grabler are illustrations of the second strategy for overcoming adverse issues of technically out statutory ambiguity. They are not
examples of the ﬁrst strategy because in neither case did the advocate look
to alternative meanings of the statutory term in question. In Walters, the
State did not look to the English language and attempt to point out
instances where people use the term “motor vehicle” to refer to a
tractor–trailer combination. Likewise, in Grabler, the court did not look to
alternative linguistic uses of the term “motor vehicle” in its attempt to
argue that the term includes a truck–trailer combination. Rather, in both

188 Id. at 1050.
189 Id. at 1051.

190 Id.
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cases, the advocates (the State in Walters and the court in Grabler)
focused on the right side of the technically out formula and sought to
evoke stock experiences and memories with the items in question that
would reconcile the instinctive collisions posed by the issues before the
courts.

III. Alternative Stock Structures in Statutory Advocacy:
More Than a Contrivance
The previous section explored two rather informal strategies for overcoming adverse stock structures in the context of technically out statutory
issues. The ﬁrst strategy called for an advocate to evoke informal uses of
words from everyday language. The second strategy called for an advocate
to evoke informal stock memories regarding common objects or situations.
What probably stands out for both of these strategies is how “nonlegal”
they appear to be. Arguing, as the court did in Oregon v. Rodriguez, that
parents often say “one more time” to their children when, in fact, they
mean “one or more additional times” hardly seems like a “legal”
argument.191 The same can be said for arguing, as the court did in Covered
Bridge, Inc. v. Town of Vail, that “street level” in a mountain town includes
shops above street level because of the nature of the architecture abutting
sloped streets.192 Admittedly, one hardly needs legal training to make such
arguments.
But informality should not be confused with triviality. Granted, these
arguments may appear, upon ﬁrst glance, to be somewhat contrived, especially compared to more formal legal arguments, such as those based on
legal rules, analogous precedents, or public policy. However, these
strategies can be powerful for cases in which they are applicable. The
source of this power stems from a combination of four important features
of these arguments:
First, a technically out statutory issue presents a unique problem for a
legal advocate because the language of the statute in question (as reflected
in both its dictionary deﬁnition and stock structure) appears to unambiguously exclude the present item or circumstance.193 Moreover, as a
general rule, a court will not allow a legal advocate to argue extrinsic aids
of statutory interpretation when the language of the relevant statute
appears to be unambiguous on its face.194 Thus, for the advocate on the

191 See supra text accompanying n. 107 (quoting Oregon v.
Rodriguez, 175 P.3d 471, 473–74 (Or. App. 2007)).
192 See supra text accompanying n. 164 (discussing
Covered Bridge, Inc. v. Town of Vail, 197 P.3d 281, 284–85
(Colo. App. 2008)).

193 See supra pt. I(B).
194 See supra text accompanying nn. 85, 107 (quoting
Oregon v. Rodriguez, 175 P.3d at 473–74).
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wrong side of this linguistic mismatch, the issue appears to be a
nonstarter.
Second, despite the rule prohibiting advocates from arguing the interpretation of unambiguous statutes, courts also generally hold that the
threshold for ﬁnding ambiguity in any given statutory provision is a low
one.195 Thus, in situations such as this, an advocate need only give a court
a plausible linguistic argument for ambiguity.
Third, these two strategies are designed to provide at least a plausible
alternative linguistic interpretation of the statutory term in question—that
is, to establish plausible ambiguity in cases of technically out statutory
interpretation.
Fourth, if a court ﬁnds that a statutory provision is plausibly subject to
more than one interpretation and is therefore plausibly ambiguous, the
court will allow attorneys on both sides of the issue to argue other aids of
statutory construction in their efforts to resolve the ambiguity.196 Because
the strategies we have discussed establish plausible ambiguity in the
statutory provision in question, they open the door for an advocate to
offer other interpretative arguments. Once the door is opened, the
advocate is free to argue more formal (and hopefully more persuasive)
arguments of statutory interpretation.
In the end, the true power of the two strategies we have explored
comes from their bootstrapping nature.197 Arguments based on these
strategies, although seemingly contrived, are plausible enough to open the
analysis up for other forms of statutory argument. Once an advocate is
freed up to argue more compelling legal arguments such as policy and
legislative history, the advocate is in a better position to persuade the
court to accept to his or her ultimate position on the statutory issue. And
the more persuasive the advocate is regarding his or her ultimate
conclusion, the more persuaded the court will be to accept the initial
“merely plausible” linguistic argument. Thus, what may start off as merely
a legally plausible linguistic interpretation of the statutory language can
end up looking like the preferred interpretation because the court is
motivated by the other, more formal legal arguments to interpret the
language that way. In other words, the weaker linguistic argument can
prevail because the other arguments can motivate the court to accept that
argument. And the whole process begins with a merely plausible linguistic
hook.

195 See e.g. supra text accompanying n. 117 (quoting Oregon v. Rodriguez, 175 P.3d at 474).
196 See e.g. supra text accompanying nn. 119–20 (discussing Oregon v. Rodriguez, 175 P.3d at 474–78).
197 For a similar discussion in a different context, see Smith, supra note 12, at 111–12.
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Finally, the success of these strategies in real-life cases should not be
overlooked or underappreciated. In all of the examples reviewed in the
previous section (except for the dissent in Pennsylvania v McCoy198), the
“informal” linguistic hook prevailed. And many other cases like these
exist.199 Thus, there is substantial evidence that these “informal” strategies
work.

IV. Conclusion
These two strategies have already been employed with success by some
legal writers in real-life cases such as those illustrated in this article. The
strategies explored here are not so much new as they are underappreciated. Though it is true that some legal writers may have employed these
strategies in these and other cases, it is unlikely that the writers were fully
aware of the cognitive implications of their efforts. The primary goal of
this article was to explain the cognitive processes underlying these
strategies so that legal advocates—even those who have used them already,
unwittingly—can apply them more consciously and more effectively.

198 See supra text accompanying n. 140–50 (discussing Pennsylvania v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160 (Pa. 2009)).
199 See, e.g. Duarte-Ceri v. Holder, 2010 WL 4968689 at *8 & n. 1 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2010) (Livingston, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the phrase “under the age of eighteen years” should be interpreted to mean “before one’s eighteenth birthday” by
referring to the interchangeable use of those phrases in everyday speech); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 204 (E.D. Ark.
1989) (interpreting the word “and” beyond its dictionary deﬁnition by evoking an alternative stock structure of that word
from everyday usage: “An example from a less exalted ﬁeld of human endeavor will illustrate the point. Suppose you say that
I have less ability to chip and putt than you do. If I am just as good a chipper as you are, but not so good at putting, this
statement, as matter of ordinary speech, is still a true one. It is a combination of qualities (play around the green) that we
are discussing, and the comparison is between our respective totals or aggregates of the qualities.”); Michigan v. Tennyson,
790 N.W.2d 354, 359 n. 5 (Mich. 2010) (interpreting the word “tend” beyond its dictionary deﬁnition by evoking an alternative stock structure of that word from everyday usage: “The term [‘tend’] implies a level of certainty greater that 50
percent. . . . This common understanding of ‘tend’ is taken for granted in everyday speech. Thus, the statement ‘I tend to be
an early riser’ conveys that I tend not to be a late riser; and the statement ‘My son tends to be a well-behaved child’ conveys
that he tends not to be a poorly behaved child. From these statements, it can be said that, more likely than not, I will get up
early and my son will behave well.”); Lee v. Oregon Racing Comm., 920 P.2d 554, 557 (Or. App. 1996) (interpreting the word
“or” beyond its dictionary deﬁnition by evoking an alternative stock structure of that word from everyday usage: “In
ordinary speech, the term ‘or’ may or may not be used to signify alternatives that are mutually exclusive. For example, the
sentence ‘Issuance of a passport permits the traveler to visit France or Italy’ does not mean that the traveler may visit France
or Italy, but not both.”).

